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Asbestos in Schools and the
Economic Loss Doctrine
For several decades in the middle of this century, contractors
made extensive use of asbestos as an insulating and structural ma-
terial. Recognizing its dangerous properties, building owners have
recently begun attempting to recover from asbestos manufacturers
the costs incurred for abatement or removal.' School boards have
been prominent in these attempts, as asbestos was widely used in
school buildings.
These actions differ from personal injury claims involving as-
bestos in that the compensation sought is for "economic
loss"-that is, for the cost of removing and replacing the asbestos
itself. Losses of this sort, which are due to the selection of a prod-
uct that is inferior or inappropriate, are normally remediable only
through a warranty action.2 By contrast, harm to a person, or to
property other than the product itself, is usually remedied by a
tort action.3
' The magnitude of the problem is enormous and growing rapidly. In re School Asbes-
tos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996, 1000 (3d Cir. 1986). Of approximately 14,000 of the nation's
schools containing friable asbestos (a crumbly form of asbestos that easily releases fibers
into the air), 8,500 have an abatement problem. See Philip Shabecoff, New Data Find As-
bestos A Peril in Home, at Job, N.Y. Times Al, col. 5, D23, col. 1 (Aug. 7, 1984) (recent
EPA report finds some 31,000 schools containing asbestos). Although "the claims currently
pending represent only a small percentage of the total number of potential claimants, the
amounts involved are already staggering." Lac D'Amiante du Quebec v. American Home
Assurance Co., 613 F.Supp. 1549, 1551 (D.N.J. 1985). Johns-Manville, a Denver-based paper
and building products corporation, alone faced $86 billion in property damage claims as of
February, 1986, and filed for bankruptcy after being flooded with more than 16,000 lawsuits
by asbestos claimants. Tamar Lewin, A New Set of Hurdles for Manville, N.Y. Times D1,
col. 3, D3, col. 1 (Feb. 17, 1986). This figure was up from $69 billion in June of 1985, School
Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d at 1000, and from approximately $1 billion in January of 1985.
See Jonathon Dahl, Flurry of Claims Against Manville Exceeds $1 Billion, Wall St. J. 3, col.
3 (Jan. 31, 1985).
' See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973)
(claim against manufacturer for breach of duty to warn of dangers involved in handling
asbestos); Note, Economic Losses and Strict Products Liability: A Record of Judicial Confu-
sion Between Contract and Tort, 54 Notre Dame Lawyer 118 (1978) (brief overview of theo-
retical framework).
3 The scope of the theory of strict liability in tort is set out in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 402A (1965) ("Restatement"), which provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
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Despite this traditional distinction, most courts faced with
claims of economic loss from asbestos abatement or removal have
analyzed the claims in tort.4 This comment explains the economic
distortion caused by the tort approach and illustrates how a con-
tract analysis provides adequate protection for purchasers while
preserving free market incentives to minimize the costs of loss pre-
vention.' More specifically, the comment analyzes one of the cen-
tral issues arising in attempts by school boards6 to recover removal
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
(Emphasis added.)
Strict liability under section 402A, then, only remedies physical harm. Similarly, section
395 ("Negligent Manufacture of Chattel Dangerous Unless Carefully Made") contemplates
only "liability for physical harm." See, e.g., Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537
F.2d 751, 755 (3d Cir. 1976); Arizona v. Cook Paint and Varnish Co., 391 F.Supp. 962, 971
n.10 (D. Ariz. 1975). Compare the scope of sales warranty set out in §§ 2-714 and 2-715 of
the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), which allows for buyer's recovery of:
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the
seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be
prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.
UCC 2-715(2). No limitation to physical harm is present. See generally E. Allan Farnsworth,
Contracts § 12.8 (1982); Note, 54 Notre Dame Lawyer 118 (cited in note 2).
' See, e.g., Adams-Arapahoe School District No. 28-J v. Celotex Corp., 637 F.Supp.
1207 (D. Colo. 1986); City of Manchester v. National Gypsum Co., 637 F.Supp. 646 (D. R.I.
1986); Town of Hooksett School District v. W.R. Grace & Co., 617 F.Supp. 126 (D. N.H.
1984); Cinnaminson Township Board of Education v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 552 F.Supp. 855 (D.
N.J. 1982). Compare City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 640 F.Supp. 559 (D. S.C. 1986)
(municipality sued for costs of removal and replacement of fireproofing in city hall that
contained asbestos); Philadelphia National Bank v. Dow Chemical Co., 605 F.Supp. 60 (E.D.
Pa. 1985) (costs of removing and replacing of an inferior construction product from building
sought on basis of structural defects rather than carcinogenic danger).
1 The importance of maintaining the distinction between tort and contract law has re-
cently been emphasized by the Supreme Court in its handling of the doctrine of economic
loss in the only area in which there is a federal common law of torts-admiralty. See East
River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 2302 (1986) ("The minority view
[rejecting the economic loss doctrine] fails to account for the need to keep products liability
and contract law in separate spheres and to maintain a realistic limitation on damages.").
' Though this comment focuses on school buildings, there seems no reason why the
same analysis should not apply to all buildings containing asbestos materials. See School
Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d at 1005, where the Third Circuit, in refusing to approve certi-
fication of a mandatory class for punitive damages, found that the class comprising schools
claiming asbestos related losses is underinclusive as it "[does] not. . . include all property
damage claimants. Claims for repair of municipal buildings, for instance, are omitted, as are
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and replacement costs from asbestos manufacturers in tort: the
characterization of this damage as physical harm.
Part I explains the legal and factual background underlying
the problem of recovery for abatement and removal costs relating
to asbestos. It concludes that, because of the statutes of limitations
involved, most school boards stand no chance of recovery unless
their claims are actionable in tort. Part II therefore examines the
range of accepted views on what damages may properly be recov-
ered in tort, as opposed to warranty. This section employs an eco-
nomic analysis that justifies treating economic loss differently from
physical harm, and that supports a distinguishing test based on the
suddenness and dangerousness of the defect in question.
Part III discusses the application of the sudden and dangerous
test in deciding the school boards' claims. It concludes that, while
certain elements of their claims relating to the contamination of
collateral property arguably may be claims for physical harm, the
costs of removal and replacement of the asbestos materials them-
selves must be considered economic loss and therefore not recover-
able in tort. Social policy considerations also support this conclu-
sion. Because many asbestos manufacturers have been reorganized
or are facing reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code, they are now effectively owned by asbestos personal injury
claimants. If school boards are allowed tort recovery against such
manufacturers, compensation will ultimately come out of the pock-
ets of victims of asbestos-related diseases.
I. BACKGROUND AND DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM
A. Historical and Statutory Developments
Asbestos is the generic name for naturally occurring minerals
that separate into fiber.7 Because asbestos is fire resistant, pos-
those of homeowners."
An attempt to distinguish school buildings from other buildings might focus on the fact
that public school students may not choose the particular school they will attend and so
constitute a class deserving of special protection by the courts. The schools might claim that
even if abatement procedures are economic loss, allowing them to recover will protect a
helpless class of school children who are both unable to protect themselves and legally re-
quired to attend school. For other somewhat strained attempts to justify special treatment
for schools, see U.S. Dept. of Justice, The Attorney General's Asbestos Liability Report to
Congress 110, 155 (Sept. 21, 1981) ("1981 Attorney General's Report").
7 See Office of Pesticides and Toxic Substances, United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, Guidance for Controlling Friable Asbestos-Containing Materials in Buildings
2-1 (1983) ("1983 EPA Study"); NIOSH-OSHA Asbestos Work Group, Workplace Exposure
to Asbestos, Review and Recommendations 10 (1980) ("1980 NIOSH Study"). "Arguments
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sesses good tensile strength, and insulates well against heat and
electricity, it came into common use as a building material around
the middle of this century.' In the 1970s, however, the EPA
banned spray-on asbestos materials because of concern over higher
rates of asbestosis and cancer observed in individuals whose occu-
pations entailed exposure to asbestos fibers."
Since 1982, the EPA has required school districts to conduct
inspections to determine whether their buildings contain asbestos
materials. 10 But these requirements have not had a practical effect,
because no guidelines have been established to determine when the
hazard is sufficient to justify removal or abatement.1" Under the
can be made for inclusion of all fibrous minerals posing risks comparable to commercially
exploited minerals called asbestos. However, a practical definition would only include those
mineral forms commonly used commercially: chrysotile, crocidolite, amosite, tremolite, ac-
tinolite, and anthophyllite." 1980 NIOSH Study at 10-11.
There is considerable evidence that the various forms of asbestos possess differing
pathenogenic properties. See Oversight Hearings on Asbestos Hazards in Elementary and
Secondary Schools, Subcomm. on Elem., Secondary, and Vocational Educ. of the House
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 109 (Apr. 27, 1983) ("1983 Oversight
Hearings") (reporting that the kind of asbestos used in schools is chrysotile, which is by far
the least dangerous); M. David Logan, Extent of Asbestos Danger Is International Disagree-
ment, Occupational Health and Safety Magazine 63 (Jan. 1986); Pamela Zurer, Asbestos:
The Fiber That's Panicking America, Chemical and Engineering News 28, 34-35 (Mar. 4,
1985) (importance of fiber length). But see 1980 NIOSH Study at 2 (cited in this note) (no
basis for differentiating among fibers for regulatory purposes).
8 See 1981 Attorney General's Report at 8-9 (cited in note 6); Asbestos School Hazard
Detection and Control Act of 1980, Sen. Rep. No. 96-710 at 3 (May 15, 1980); 20 U.S.C.
§ 4011(a)(4) (1984).
' In 1973, the EPA banned the spraying of asbestos for insulating and fireproofing. See
40 C.F.R. § 61.22(e) (1973); 1983 Oversight Hearings at 34 (cited in note 7). In 1978, the
EPA widened its restriction to include all spray applications for any purpose. 40 C.F.R.
§ 61.22(e) (1978). For current EPA asbestos rules, see 40 C.F.R. § 61.148, 61.150 (1985). See
also Francis J. Flaherty, Second Wave of Litigation Hits Asbestos, Nat'l L. J. 1, col. 1 (Oct.
29, 1984). The EPA recently proposed a total ban on all asbestos products, to take effect
within the next ten years. The primary remaining uses of asbestos are for cement pipe,
coatings, friction products (brakes), packing and gaskets, and roofing products. Asbestos
Users Step Up Search for Substitutes, Chem. Engin. Mag. 18, 19 (Oct. 27, 1986).
Human occupational exposures to all commercial asbestos fiber types, both individually
and in various combinations, have been associated with elevated rates of asbestosis, a
debilitating lung disease; lung cancer; and mesothelioma, a rare but invariably fatal cancer
of the chest and abdominal lining. See, e.g., 1983 EPA Study at 1-1 (cited in note 7); 1980
NIOSH Study at 2, 18, 19, 24 (cited in note 7) (surveying many prior studies establishing
the correlation); Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F.Supp. 539, 544 (D. Minn.
1982); 20 U.S.C. § 4011(a)(1).
10 40 C.F.R. § 763.100 (1985). See also Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605
(1985).
11 See The Asbestos School Hazard Abatement Act of 1984, 20 U.S.C. § 4011(a)(8)
(1984); Comment, Issues in School Asbestos Hazard Abatement Litigation, 16 St. Mary's L.
J. 951, 955 & n.14 (1985).
For criticisms of EPA's previous attempts to provide a reliable measure of hazards from
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Asbestos Hazard Emergency Act of 1986, the EPA is required by
November, 1987 to promulgate regulations that specify inspection
standards and appropriate responses.12 Even without such guide-
lines, most school districts undertake some form of abatement pro-
cedure if they discover asbestos in their school buildings. 3 Thus,
in many cases the question is not whether abatement will occur,
but rather who will bear its costs.
Schools may seek funding for abatement under the Asbestos
School Hazard Abatement Act of 1984 ("1984 Act").14 This statute,
an improvement on similar prior legislation,1 5 provides grants and
low-interest loans for abatement procedures. 6 But even the 1984
nonoccupational exposure, see Michael E. Findley et al., An Assessment of the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency's Asbestos Hazard Evaluation Algorithm, 73 Amer. J. Pub. Health
1179, 1180-81 (1983); Morton Corn, Asbestos and Disease: An Industrial Hygienist's Per-
spective, 47 Amer. Indus. Hygiene Assoc. J. 515, 520 (Sept. 1986) (EPA algorithm "can only
be viewed as administrative arrogance bordering on 'chutzpah' "). The EPA's previous fail-
ures in this regard may be understandable in light of the scientific uncertainty relating to
the dose/response curve of asbestos and the technical difficulties of measuring exposure
levels. See, e.g., 1983 Oversight Hearings at 42 (cited in note 7) (statement of Edward A.
Klein, Director, Chemical Control Division, Office of Toxic Substances, EPA).
1, See, e.g., 51 Fed. Reg. 42812 (Nov. 25, 1986). The EPA must issue final rules pertain-
ing to: 1) inspection of all school buildings for asbestos materials; 2) standards identifying
circumstances requiring response; 3) descriptions of appropriate response actions; 4) imple-
mentation of those response actions; 5) establishment of monitoring programs; 6) prepara-
tion and implementation of asbestos management plans; 7) submission of those manage-
ment plans to state governors; 8) the transportation and disposal of the removed asbestos;
and 9) the development of model state accreditation programs for persons who perform
inspections, prepare management plans, and work in asbestos abatement industry.
IS Asbestos in Schools: Hearings Held on Adequacy of Federal Efforts to Control As-
bestos Hazards, summarized in Andrews, Asbestos Litig. Rep. 9026, 9027 (Oct. 5, 1984)
(two-thirds of schools with asbestos problems have taken corrective action or are in the
process of taking corrective action).
14 20 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4021 (1984). In some instances a school district may not have ac-
cess to funding for abatement without advance assistance. In these situations, the question
may be not only who will bear the ultimate cost, but also when the abatement procedures
will commence.
15 20 U.S.C. § 3601-3611 (1980). Perhaps the most important difference between the
1980 Act and the 1984 Act is that the latter disburses money more generously. Compare 20
U.S.C. § 3605 (providing only loans for abatement and only up to 50 percent of the costs)
with 20 U.S.C. § 4014(e) (providing loans for up to 100 percent of abatement costs, or a
combination of loans and grants if an applicant is unable to undertake and complete an
asbestos abatement program with a loan).
1" The 1984 Act is intended to "provide continuing scientific and technical assistance
to State and local agencies to enable them to identify and abate asbestos hazards in schools"
and to "provide financial assistance for the abatement of asbestos threats to the health and
safety of school children or employees." 20 U.S.C. § 4011(b)(2), (3). In addition to the fed-
eral program, some nineteen states have created parallel asbestos abatement funds to assist
local schools in abatement. See Asbestos School Hazard Detection and Control Act: Hear-
ings on H.R. 11 & H.R. 4720, Subcomm. on Elem., Secondary, and Vocational Educ. of the
House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (describing the plans of these
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Act may not satisfy the financial needs of afflicted schools. As an
initial matter, the program established by the 1984 Act may be
drastically underfunded. 17 Furthermore, the EPA consistently has
declined to request and disburse even the limited funds estab-
lished by the 1984 Act.18 In addition to forcing schools into a
lengthy administrative process, the 1984 Act may not provide any
sort of assistance for some of the schools' losses, such as replace-
ment costs for contaminated curtains or carpets.19
The inadequacy of the statutory response to schools' funding
needs may drive schools to litigation. 20 But even if the 1984 Act
nineteen states) ("1984 Asbestos Hearings").
17 The law provides for loans of up to 100 percent of the costs of abatement which are
interest-free for twenty years. See 20 U.S.C. § 4014(e), (f). If a loan is inadequate, the 1984
Act authorizes a grant that is not to exceed 50 percent of the total abatement cost. Id. at
§ 4014(e)(1). The loans and grants are based on financial need. Id. § 4014(c), (d). The 1984
Act allocates a total of $500 million over the five-year period from 1986 through 1990. Id. at
§ 4021(a)(1).
Even with parallel state programs supplementing the federal fund, however, it seems
highly unlikely that these resources alone will be sufficient to cover the billions of dollars
required for abatement and removal. Some observers predict that the removal costs will
total $1.4 billion; this estimate is based on projections of 14,000 affected schools and re-
moval costs of $100,000 per school. See 1984 Asbestos Hearings at 23 (cited in note 16);
Robert D. Lang, The Problem of Asbestos in the Public schools, N.Y. State Bar J. 20 (Nov.
1984). This projection appears to be overly optimistic. For an example of the actual options
and costs available to one school, see Board of Education v. Ambach, 123 Misc.2d 622, 474
N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (removal ($719,250), encapsulation ($239,400), containment
($304,500), combined encapsulation removal ($605,850)). Extrapolating from similar figures,
the abatement costs for public schools would total between $48 and $54 billion. 1984 Asbes-
tos Hearings at 23 (cited in note 16).
'8 The administration consistently failed to call for funding for the predecessor 1980
Act in the past. See 1984 Asbestos Hearings at 11 (cited in note 16). Both the 1987 and 1988
budgets provide only half of the $100 million authorized. Office of Management and Budget,
Appendix to Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 1987 at I-T3 (1986); Of-
fice of Management and Budget, Appendix to Budget of the United States Government
Fiscal Year 1988 at I-T2 (1987). The House of Representatives recently approved a resolu-
tion that would force the EPA to stick to a rigid timetable for distributing funds to schools
to clean up asbestos. See House Orders U.S. to Distribute Asbestos Cleanup Funds to
Schools, N.Y. Times 11, col. 1 (Feb. 25, 1987).
29 The extent of the remedy provided by the 1984 Act is unclear. The focus of the 1984
Act seems to be limited to the actual removal of asbestos materials from the afflicted
schools; it does not seem to contemplate reimbursement for the cost of full restoration to a
condition equal to that which would have existed had the materials never been used. Hence,
it seems unlikely that a request for replacement of collateral property would succeed. But
see 20 U.S.C. § 4014(c)(1)(C), which provides for the restoration of "school buildings to
conditions comparable to those existing before abatement activities were undertaken." How-
ever, this provision may be construed to limit recovery to the cost of cleaning up postabate-
ment debris or any other costs caused by the actual abatement process.
20 The 1984 Act explicitly preserves the schools' right to "seek legal redress in connec-
tion with the purchase or installation of asbestos materials in schools." 20 U.S.C. § 4019(1)
(Supp. 1985). Even a school receiving grants and loans under the statute may maintain such
an action, but the proceeds must be used, to the extent they are sufficient, to repay any
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proves sufficient to meet schools' needs, litigation will remain at-
tractive. School boards may prefer to win a judgment for the full
cost of abatement rather than to participate in a program that pro-
vides loans for abatement. The availability of legal action may
even motivate schools to abate and recover unnecessarily, where
they would not have abated at their own expense. In any case,
school boards and city and state governments are filing property
damage lawsuits against asbestos manufacturers, contractors, and
suppliers, seeking billions of dollars in damages.
B. Damage Actions in Contract and Tort
Breach of warranty is the appropriate contract law action for
recovery of abatement costs if such costs are classified as economic
losses. 21 A cause of action for economic loss could be brought under
the Uniform Commercial Code's implied warranty of
merchantability 22 or its implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose.23 But the maximum four-year statute of limitations im-
posed by the UCC 24 on all actions for breach of sales warranty
would bar both claims in the context of economic loss due to
asbestos.25
Because very few school boards retain any contract rights
against asbestos suppliers, the boards must have state tort causes
loans or grants received under the Act. 20 U.S.C. § 4017(a)(2) (Supp. 1985).
11 See William L. Prosser and W. Page Keeton, The Law of Torts § 95A 680 (5th ed.
1984) (UCC is exclusive source for liability if claim arises from intangible economic loss);
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 9, 45 Cal.Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145, 149 (1965); Mid-
Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978);
Price v. Gatlin, 241 Or. 315, 405 P.2d 502, 503-04 (1965); Comment, Manufacturer's Liabil-
ity to Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 539, 541 (1966) (" 'Economic loss' is defined as the diminution in the value of the
product because it is inferior in quality and does not work for the general purposes for
which it was manufactured and sold."). But see Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J.
52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (suggesting economic loss could be recoverable in tort).
22 UCC § 2-314.
23 UCC § 2-315.
24 Section 2-725(1) of the UCC stipulates that "[a]n action for breach of any contract
for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued," and
section 2-725(2) provides that "[a] cause of action accrues when breach occurs, regardless of
the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when
tender of delivery is made."
The exceptions to UCC 2-725(2) are not applicable to the asbestos cases. See Cinnamin-
son Township, 552 F.Supp. at 858.
2" Because the EPA in 1973 banned the spray application of materials containing more
than one percent asbestos, most current claims stem from transactions now more than ten
years old. See 1981 Attorney General's Report at 97 (cited in note 6), citing 38 Fed. Reg.
8820 (1973).
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of action if they are to recover. Only in tort may schools take ad-
vantage of the "discovery rule," applied by many states, which
tolls the statute of limitations until the time the plaintiff actually
learned, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should
have learned, of his cause of action against the defendant.2 Even
with the benefit of the discovery rule, the tort statute of limita-
tions may have run in some asbestos cases. Schools may not be
able to preserve their tort actions by arguing that they knew of the
danger but not of the legal remedy.2" Many schools' tort claims
also may be barred because the vast majority of states have en-
acted statutes of repose that place an outside time limit on negli-
gence and strict liability claims governed by the discovery rule.29
But frequently, courts in asbestos cases have found ways to pre-
serve the tort action in spite of a statute of repose.30 Further, some
state courts have recently found statutes of repose to be inconsis-
tent with their state constitutions."1 In addition, actions based on
26 See generally Prosser and Keeton, Torts at 165-67 (cited in note 21).
27 See 1983 Oversight Hearings at 15 (cited in note 7) (statement of Neil G. McBride,
Director of Legal Services Program). Schools apparently cannot seek refuge in state statutes
exempting governmental bodies from the statute of limitations. County of Johnson v. U. S.
Gypsum Co., 580 F.Supp. 284, 288 (E.D. Tenn. 1984); 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation Of Actions
§§ 416, 421 (1970). But see Diamond v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 51 N.J. 594, 242
A.2d 622 (1968); 16 Vernon's Tex. Civ. Stats. Ann. Art. 5517 ("The right of the State, coun-
ties, incorporated cities and all school districts shall not be barred by any of the provisions
of this Title."). Nor would the situation be remedied by having the federal government sue
on behalf of the school boards under the 1984 Act. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 4017, 4019 (Supp. 1985).
A suit brought by the United States on behalf of the school boards would be timely only if a
suit brought by the school boards themselves would have been timely. 1981 Attorney Gen-
eral's Report at 199 (cited in note 6).
28 Compare Damato v. Turner & Newall, Ltd., 651 F.2d 908 (3d Cir. 1981) (lack of
knowledge about legal bases for prospective claims will not toll Pennsylvania statute of limi-
tations), with Sahlie v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 99 Wash.2d 550, 663 P.2d 473 (1983)
(cause of action accrues with either actual or imputed discovery of the essential elements of
the cause of action).
29 Prosser and Keeton, Torts at 167-68 (cited in note 21). Statutes of repose normally
run for a longer period of time than the statutes of limitations. General negligence statutes
of limitations for personal injury range in duration from one to six years. Id. at 168 n.31. In
comparison, statutes of repose allow from six to twelve years to bring an action for products
liability and from four to ten years to bring an architect-contractor case. Id. at 168.
20 See, e.g. County of Johnson, 580 F.Supp. at 290-92 (examining the state "Products
Liability Cap" and holding that school's claim was preserved despite ten-year limit by a
clause exempting actions "resulting from exposure to asbestos"); Cinnaminson Township,
552 F.Supp. at 862 (court found that the statute of repose for design defects "was intended
to reach only those engaged in the design, planning and construction of improvements to
real estate" and not for the benefit of "manufacturers and sellers of products. . . . Product
design alone is not enough to trigger the applicability of the statute.") (citation omitted).
31 See, e.g., Vilardebo v. Keene Corp., 431 So.2d 620 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983); Note, The
Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose: Federalism Reigns, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 627 (1985);
Thomas J. Dennis, Product Liability Statutes of Repose As Conflicting with State Constitu-
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fraud or misrepresentation survive, and such actions may preserve
other claims as well.32
Of the two possible tort theories-negligence and strict prod-
ucts liability-negligence claims will be more difficult to maintain,
because one element of such claims is foreseeability. It is unclear
whether asbestos manufacturers should have known of the risks
posed by the relatively low levels of asbestos exposure associated
with the use of their building materials at the time those materials
were sold. 3 Even now, these risks have not been well quantified.3
In contrast, a strict products liability action is feasible because a
plaintiff must show only that a product was defective in a way that
made it "unreasonably dangerous. '3 5 Building materials containing
asbestos were certainly defective in design, in that they possessed
defects that later proved unreasonably dangerous.3  Thus, products
tions: The Plaintiffs Are Winning, 26 Ariz. L. Rev. 363 (1984); Note, The Constitutionality
of Connecticut's Product Liability Statute of Repose, 6 U. Bridgeport L. Rev. 49 (1985). But
contrast Braswell v. Flintkote Mines, Ltd., 723 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1983) (upholding the con-
stitutionality of Indiana's ten-year statute of repose as applied to asbestos actions).
3, See Hooksett School District, 617 F.Supp 126; County of Johnson, 580 F.Supp. at
290, 292.
3 The potential health hazards associated with the use of materials with asbestos as
structural and insulation components of buildings first became generally known in 1977,
when researchers observed elevated concentrations of airborne fibers in buildings con-
structed using such materials. 1983 Oversight Hearings at 28 (cited in note 7). However, the
danger of occupational exposure to asbestos has been appreciated since the 1920s and 1930s.
Borel, 493 F.2d at 1083-84; Bertrand, 529 F.Supp. at 544. The manufacturers are held to the
standards of experts, which requires them to keep abreast of scientific discoveries, knowl-
edge, and advances. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1089. However, even taking account of such assumed
knowledge, some believe that extrapolation of hazards at low exposure levels was not possi-
ble until quite recently. See Brief of National Gypsum Company, United States Gypsum
Company, and W. R. Grace & Co. In Support of Motion for Transfer For Coordinated Pre-
trial Proceedings at 12, In re School Asbestos Litigation, No. 2279-84-NG-8286 (Jud. Panel
on Multidist. Litig. Dec. 6, 1984), reprinted in Andrews, Asbestos Litig. Rep. 9413, 9417
(Dec. 21, 1984).
3 1980 NIOSH Study at 31 (cited in note 7). See also Stanley L. Robbins, Ramzi S.
Cotran, and Vinay Kumar, Pathologic Basis of Disease 438 (3d ed. 1984) ("While there is a
general relationship between intensity of exposure and the development of asbestos and
related lesions (neoplasms) no specific threshold level has been established."); M. David
Logan, Asbestos Health Risks: A Continental Conflict, 4 Nat'l Asbestos Council J. 12 (1986)
(Canada and the United States disagree on the dangers of asbestos in non-occupational set-
tings.); The EPA Finds Itself Forced to Review its Studies, 2 Asbestos 1 (1986) (EPA admits
its health studies were flawed in failing to account for fibre type, size, and industrial process
involved); note 118 below.
31 Restatement at § 402A (cited in note 3). In a products liability action, the focus is on
the product, rather than on the manufacturer's conduct.
11 See Prosser and Keeton, Torts at 695, 697, 698 (cited in note 21). Cases involving
defects in design generally employ a balancing approach akin to that used in negligence law;
liability is premised on a finding that an alternative safer design was feasible. Id. at 699.
According to Castleman, safer alternatives to asbestos insulation were available: "[Aisbestos
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liability claims stand a much better chance of success than negli-
gence claims.
II. THE BORDER BETWEEN WARRANTY AND PRODUCTS
LIABILITY ACTIONS
Products liability law, which allows recovery without proof of
negligence on the part of the defendant manufacturer, reflects a
public policy judgment that citizens need broader protection
against defective products than warranties afford.3 7 The rationale
supporting this public policy is that "responsibility [should] be
fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life
and health inherent in defective products that reach the market." '38
As the Supreme Court recently explained, concerns about public
safety led to a broadening of the manufacturer's duty of care to
include protection against property damage in the context of
admiralty.39
A. Three Current Views
Courts have split on whether, and under what circumstances,
injury to the defective product itself is compensable in a products
liability action.40 Products liability's overarching goal of public
safety should be kept in mind in evaluating the courts' three dif-
ferent approaches.
1. The majority approach. The majority view is that losses
resulting from damage to the product itself caused by its failure to
function properly can be recovered only through actions in breach
of warranty.41 These courts rely on the fact that section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts4 2 provides for strict liability
only in cases of physical injury to person or property, and they
therefore hold that the UCC embodies the sole cause of action for
cases involving purely economic loss. This approach avoids the
played a limited role in thermal insulation products.. . . [T]he acceptability of alternative
materials in place of asbestos has been a fixture in this technology since the 19th century."
Barry I. Castleman, Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects 296 (1984).
37 Seely, 403 P.2d at 149.
"8 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Tray-
nor J., concurring).
39 East River Steamship, 106 S.Ct. at 2300.
40 Id. at 2300-01.
41 See, e.g., Seely, 403 P.2d 145; Mid-Continent, 572 S.W.2d at 313. See also cases cited
in David E. Bland and Robert M. Wattson, Property Damage Caused by Defective Prod-
ucts: What Losses are Recoverable?, 9 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 1, 32-36 (1984).
42 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1977).
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conceptually difficult problem of distinguishing damage caused by
an accident to the product itself from that caused by ordinary wear
and tear.
The seminal case distinguishing economic loss from physical
property damage is Seely v. White Motor Co.4" In Seely, the court
found that the owner of a truck could recover only under warranty
for the purchase price and profits lost by virtue of a shock absorp-
tion defect that rendered the truck useless in the plaintiff's heavy-
duty hauling business. However, the plaintiff could, and did, re-
cover in tort for the costs of repair incurred when the brakes failed
and caused an accident that damaged the truck. The court stated:
The law of sales has been carefully articulated to govern the
economic relations between suppliers and consumers of goods.
The history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates
that it was designed, not to undermine the warranty provi-
sions of the sales act or of the Uniform Commercial Code but,
rather, to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries.4'
The distinction between economic loss and property damage
drawn in the subsequent case law is not clear. Economic loss nor-
mally includes the "diminution in the value of the product because
it is inferior in quality and does not work for the general purposes
for which it was manufactured and sold.' 45 The damage measures
for economic loss therefore attempt to preserve the benefit of the
contracting parties' bargain; damages may be measured by calcu-
lating the difference between the value of the product received and
the value as agreed upon at the time of purchase.46 Or, they may
be calculated according to the cost of replacement or repair.'7 Such
a damage measure is consistent with the traditional categorization
4S 63 Cal.2d 9, 45 Cal.Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965). Although Seely is clearly the lead-
ing case rejecting recovery of economic loss in tort, the California Supreme Court's treat-
ment of the issue was not necessary to its holding because it had already found for the
plaintiff on a breach of express warranty. Interestingly, in this respect, Seely is like Santor,
the leading case for the opposite proposition, which also treated the issue only in dicta. See
Santor, 207 A.2d at 310-11.
4, Seely, 403 P.2d at 149.
43 Pennsylvania Glass Sand, 652 F.2d at 1169, quoting Comment, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. at
541 (cited in note 21).
48 Pennsylvania Glass Sand, 652 F.2d at 1169 n.13, citing Note, Economic Loss in
Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 917, 918 (1966).
47 Pennsylvania Glass Sand, 652 F.2d at 1169 n.13. The court in Pennsylvania Glass
Sand pointed out that consequential economic loss includes all indirect loss, such as lost
profits or the cost of removal, resulting from the inability to make use of a defective
product.
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of removal and replacement costs as economic losses.4 8
In a case in admiralty, the only federal common law of torts,
the Supreme Court endorsed the majority view in East River
Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval.49 It characterized all
types of economic loss, whether slow to develop or due to a "sud-
den, accident-like event," as "essentially the failure of the pur-
chaser to receive the benefit of its bargain-traditionally the core
concern of contract law."' 50 The Court reasoned that the intermedi-
ate "sudden and dangerous" test is "too indeterminate to enable
manufacturers easily to structure their business behavior." 51 Thus,
the Court defined "economic loss" to include all types of damage
to the defective product itself.
2. The minority approach. A minority of state courts hold
that any injury to the defective product itself is compensable re-
gardless of whether it created an unreasonable risk of harm.52
These courts reject as arbitrary the distinction between injuries to
persons and other property ("physical harm") and injury to the
defective product itself ("economic loss").
3. A compromise. Some courts adopt an intermediate view,
allowing recovery for economic loss when the public policies of
safety and insurance that underlie products liability actions de-
mand that recovery be given.53 Drawing on these policies, these
courts distinguish between "the disappointed users . . . and the
endangered ones. '5 4 A key distinction in these cases is whether the
injury occurred suddenly and in a dangerous fashion.
These jurisdictions make a broader assessment of "the nature
of the defect and the manner in which the damage occurred" when
considering whether damage to the defective product itself is re-
coverable in tort.5 "Defects of quality, evidenced by internal dete-
48 Note, 66 Colum. L. Rev. at 918 (cited in note 46). See also, e.g., Indus. Uniform
Rental v. Intern. Harvester, 317 Pa.Super. 65, 463 A.2d 1085 (1983).
49 106 S.Ct. 2295 (1986).
50 Id. at 2302. The Court's unanimous decision binds only federal courts deciding admi-
ralty claims, but the reasoning is fully applicable to the state common law of tort.
81 Id. at 2302.
82 East River Steamship, 106 S.Ct. at 2301, citing Santor, 207 A.2d at 312-13. See also
Thompson v. Nebraska Mobile Homes Corp., 198 Mont. 461, 647 P.2d 334 (1983); Mead
Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Ins. Co., 465 F.Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio 1979); City of La Crosse v.
Schubert, Schroeder & Associates, Inc., 72 Wis.2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124 (1976); Cova v. Har-
ley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich.App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970).
53 East River Steamship, 106 S.Ct. at 2301, citing Pennsylvania Glass Sand, 652 F.2d at
1173.
51 Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Or. 587, 575 P.2d 1383, 1387 (1978).
55 The courts hold that these factors indicate whether the defect was "unreasonably
dangerous" to other property or persons under § 402A. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Glass Sand,
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rioration or breakdown, are assigned to the economic loss category,
while the loss stemming from defects that cause accidents 'of vio-
lence or collision with external objects' is treated as physical in-
jury.''s5 An accident in which a defective product causes damage to
itself or to other property is a form of physical injury5 7 and often is
hazardous to persons or property; it is not simply an instance of
poor quality or unsuitability of the product to its task. For exam-
ple, operation of a defective radiator causes property damage if it
results in a fire that destroys the plaintiff's store; but economic loss
results if it produces a temperature so uncomfortable that it causes
a loss of customer patronage.5 9
Embodying this broader approach, the "sudden and danger-
ous" test 0 is based on the rationale that sudden and dangerous
accidents pose a greater safety risk to both persons and property
than do simple product defects and so are properly actionable in
tort.6 1 For example, in Pennsylvania Glass Sand v. Caterpillar
Tractor Corp.,62 the buyer of a front-end loader sued the manufac-
turer for repair and replacement costs arising from damage to the
loader itself. After four years of use without incident, the ma-
chine's hydraulic fluid had caught fire, causing extensive damage.
652 F.2d at 1170 n.14; Vulcan Materials Co., Inc. v. Driltech, Inc., 251 Ga. 383, 306 S.E.2d
253, 257 (1983).
" Pennsylvania Glass Sand, 652 F.2d at 1169-70.
V Seely, 403 P.2d at 152. Dean Prosser has stated the principle:
There can be no doubt that the seller's liability for negligence covers any kind of physi-
cal harm, including not only personal injuries, but also property damage to the defec-
tive chattel itself, as where an automobile is wrecked by reason of its own bad brakes.
William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 665 (4th ed. 1971) ("Prosser Hornbook").
I8 Pennsylvania Glass Sand, 652 F.2d at 1169.
59 Northern Power & Engineering Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 327
(Alaska 1981), quoting Note, 66 Colum. L. Rev. at 918 (cited in note 46).
80 See Pennsylvania Glass Sand, 652 F.2d at 1174; Vulcan Materials, 306 S.E.2d at 257;
Northern Power, 623 P.2d at 328 & nn. 4, 5.
" See Comment, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 548 n.54 (cited in note 21). Dean Prosser has
commented on the theoretical distinctions between actions in tort and actions in contract-
The fundamental difference between tort and contract lies in the nature of the inter-
ests protected. Tort actions are created to protect the interest in freedom from various
kinds of harm. The duties of conduct which give rise to them are imposed by the law,
and are based primarily upon social policy, and not necessarily upon the will or inten-
tion of the parties. They may be owed to all those within the range of harm, or to some
considerable class of people. Contract actions are created to protect the interest in hav-
ing promises performed. Contract obligations are imposed because of conduct of the
parties manifesting consent, and are owed only to the specific individuals named in the
contract.
Prosser Hornbook at 613 (cited in note 57). See also Bland and Wattson, 9 Win. Mitchell L.
Rev. at 4 n.14 (cited in note 41).
42 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981).
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The plaintiff alleged that the loader was defective because it was
not equipped with a fire suppression system or with instructions on
the appropriate response to a fire. The court found that
the nature of the defect and the type of risk it poses are the
guiding factors. Here, the damage to the front-end loader was
the result of a fire-a sudden and highly dangerous occur-
rence. Moreover, the alleged defect-a faulty design that
failed to contain the fire and led to greatly enhanced dam-
age-constitutes a safety hazard that posed a serious risk of
harm to people and property. Thus, the complaint . . . ap-
pears to fall within the policy of tort law that the manufac-
turer should bear the risk of hazardous products.6 3
Pennsylvania Glass Sand illustrates that the content of the
terms "economic loss" and "property damage" should be informed
by the underlying tort law policies governing the recoverability of
damages caused by certain defects, and by the agreement of the
parties.6 4 Thus, justification for the differential treatment of de-
fects of quality and safety hazards must be sought by identifying
and appraising the underlying policy considerations involved in
products liability law.
B. Theoretical Justifications for Redressing Defects of Quality
Through Contract and Safety Hazards Through Tort
1. Risk allocation: private agreement versus public regula-
tion. As noted in Seely,6" 5 the distinction drawn between property
damage recoverable in tort and economic loss recoverable only in
warranty reflects a judicial estimation of how risks should be allo-
cated to parties in a sale given three possible techniques: (1) agree-
ment, (2) use of standardized terms that will be inferred (usually
from the UCC) in the absence of explicit agreement, and (3) recog-
nition of duties that are mandated by law and that cannot be allo-
cated by the parties themselves. An express warranty falls into the
first category, an implied warranty into the second, and liabilities
arising from products liability law into the third. Courts decide
Id. at 1174-75 (citations omitted).
See also Cloud v. Kit Manufacturing Co., 563 P.2d 248, 251 (Alaska 1977) ("In their
attempts to distinguish between direct property damage and economic loss, the courts
should be guided by the existence of, and underlying purposes for, the Uniform Commercial
Code warranty actions."); City of Manchester 637 F.Supp. at 650 ("in order to determine in
which category the damages alleged here fit, I will turn, as have other courts, to the policy
reasons behind the division between 'economic' and 'physical' damages").
45 403 P.2d at 151.
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which risks are to be allocated by law (rather than by private
agreement) and enforce the risk allocations made by each of the
three methods.
Because almost every sale involves the allocation of risks, 6 it
is important that these risks be allocated efficiently. Efficient allo-
cation occurs when the party able to handle the risk at the least
cost bears the risk. In an ideal market-where rational actors pos-
sess perfect information and transactions are costless-sellers and
buyers who bargain freely should arrive at the most efficient allo-
cation of risk among themselves. 7 A rigid rule fixing liability on a
particular party may impose needless costs on transactions subject
to the rule.68 For example, a buyer who already has insurance for
bodily injury may not want duplicative coverage; such a buyer
would prefer to accept this risk rather than pay a higher price that
included some insurance component. Alternatively, the buyer may
be able to diversify his own risks, and so may be able to avoid the
transaction and overhead costs involved with traditional liability
insurance.69
However, market defects sometimes create compelling policy
justifications for judicial intervention in the allocation process. In
reality, buyers may have insufficient information to evaluate risks
associated with particular products. Not only may manufacturers
be unwilling to disclose information from their greater experience
with the product to the consumer, but the consumer may be un-
willing to expend any significant amount of time to read such dis-
go Risks associated with a sale may include uncertainty of a product's condition, its
quality, and its functional characteristics, in addition to risks to third parties arising from
product malfunctions. Each of these risks may be allocated differently among the parties
according to their positions regarding the particular risk.
67 See Ronald J. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960). Among
the conditions necessary for an ideal market are: (1) perfect information, (2) zero transac-
tion costs, (3) instantaneous equilibrium, and (4) rational actors. See generally Jack Hirsh-
leifer, Price Theory and Applications 8-12, 418-19 (3d ed. 1984). Regarding mass tort claims,
an ideal market also would prevent firms from externalizing accident costs through bank-
ruptcy and corporate reorganization. See Robert D. Couter, Defective Warnings, Remote
Causes, and Bankruptcy: Comment on Schwartz, 14 J. Legal Stud. 737, 748-50 (1985). Of
course, no market is ideal, but the model provides a valuable analytical starting point when
analyzing market behavior.
'a In excluding economic loss from tort recovery as the federal rule in admiralty, the
Supreme Court observed: "[s]ociety need not presume that the customer needs special pro-
tection [against economic loss]. The increased cost to the public that would result from
holding a manufacturer liable in tort for injury to the product itself is not justified." East
River Steamship, 106 S.Ct. at 2302.
9 For a discussion of risk aversion and the allocation of risks, see Steven Shavell, Eco-
nomic Analysis of Accident Law ch. 8, § A (forthcoming 1987).
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closures or to understand all potential defects.70 Finally, the con-
sumer may be in a poor position to assess how much of a reduction
in the price of the product he should receive in return for bearing
risks himself.
Products liability law thus fixes liability for physical harm
caused by a defective product on the manufacturer, the party who
has the most information and is thus best able to avoid the harm
in the first place. The strict liability rule forces manufacturers to
internalize the cost of injuries to third parties, so that overly dan-
gerous products-whose social utility is less than the damage
caused by their defects-disappear from commerce. 1 The manu-
facturer, with superior information, will evaluate the risk more ac-
curately and so will price the product closer to its true social cost.
In addition, there may be significant savings in information
costs through greater efficiency from requiring the manufacturer,
rather than each consumer, to evaluate product risks. The most
obvious savings would result from the elimination of duplicative
efforts on the part of consumers gathering information or testing
products. 2
Information asymmetries and high information costs are im-
portant market defects, but the market defect perhaps most often
cited in support of products liability is the irrationality of market
participants. "Irrational" buyers, it is believed, are either unable to
consider and evaluate certain risks of physical harm, or too irre-
sponsible to insure against risks in exchange for a reduction in the
purchase price of products they buy.73 Courts that subscribe to this
70 For a brief treatment of the nature of customers' true knowledge of product risks,
see Shavell, Accident Law at ch. 3, § B.4 (cited in note 69).
71 See Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring): "It is to the public interest to
discourage the marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the public. If such
products nevertheless find their way into the market it is to the public interest to place the
responsibility for whatever injury they may cause upon the manufacturer." That is, by mak-
ing the manufacturer bear the liability for accidents caused by defective products, the law
forces him to set a price adequate to cover their true social cost.
72 For similar arguments advanced in support of disclosure requirements under the se-
curities regulations, see George J. Benston, Required Periodic Disclosure Under the Securi-
ties Acts and the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 33 U. Miami L. Rev. 1471, 1473-74
(1979) ("It is likely that the cost to the corporation of producing such [product] information
is less than the aggregate cost to potential and present investors since their efforts are likely
to be duplicative.").
73The Supreme Court has rejected this model, at least in a purely commercial context,
observing that:
Contract law, and the law of warranty in particular, is well suited to commercial con-
troversies [involving economic loss] of the sort involved in this case because the parties
may set the terms of their own agreements. The manufacturer can restrict its liability,
within limits, by disclaiming warranties or limiting remedies.. . . In exchange, the pur-
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model feel obligated to protect both consumers and injured third
parties from consumers' own shortsightedness in the event of an
uninsured loss.7 ' These courts fix liability on the manufacturer be-
cause he is presumed to be more rational; he will insure against
risks and recover the costs through higher prices.75
The expansion of products liability theory suggests wide ac-
ceptance of this model. Yet the model is overtly paternalistic. By
building insurance into the price of goods, products liability does
not respect even a deliberate and informed choice not to insure.
Such a decision need not be a product of irrationality; instead, it
may be the result of risk preference or financial constraints.
The logical consequence of the paternalistic model is that all
risks to consumers of products should be assigned to manufactur-
ers by law.76 Such an extreme approach forfeits the benefits result-
ing from voluntary (and thus prima facie efficient) allocation of
risk. It is therefore justifiable only where very severe market de-
fects are certain to exist. Where market defects are insignificant or
unproven, and the benefits of voluntary allocation are the greatest,
bargaining for risk should be preserved. As the following discussion
demonstrates, because bargaining for risks relating to the quality
and function of goods meets these conditions, these risks should
remain in the domain of warranty; and because bargaining for risks
relating to sudden and dangerous accidents does not meet these
conditions, these risks should be allocated by tort.
2. Two conditions for voluntary allocation of risk.
a.) No significant market defects. As we have seen, informa-
tional asymmetry and high information costs are two important ex-
amples of market defects. Initially, it may appear that the manu-
facturer's superiority of knowledge is even greater with regard to
chaser pays less for the product.
East River Steamship, 106 S.Ct. at 2303 (citations omitted). This savings is the value of the
risk assumed. To put himself in a similar situation as if an action at law existed for eco-
nomic loss deriving from a defect in the product, the purchaser could buy insurance with
the money saved on the price. Id. at 2302.
74 In Escola, Justice Traynor apparently intended to protect consumers from their own
carelessness and unpreparedness: "Consumers no longer approach products warily but ac-
cept them on faith." 150 P.2d at 443. "Those who suffer injury from defective products are
unprepared to meet its consequences." Id. at 441. For economists, an "irrational" actor is
one who does not try to maximize his expected utility through his decisions.
75 See Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring) ("[T]he cost of an injury and
the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a
needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed
among the public as a cost of doing business.").
76 See East River Steamship, 106 S.Ct. at 2302; Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract
87-94 (1974).
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mundane defects of product quality that cause the product to be-
come inoperable than with regard to defects potentially causing a
sudden and dangerous accident. Because product quality defects
are much more common, the manufacturer may have collected
more statistical data on the probability of such defects.
Nevertheless, the buyer knows two important things about
qualitative and functional risks that the manufacturer does not
know: (1) the probable extent of the direct loss, which normally
will be limited to the cost of replacement, and (2) the probable
extent of any consequential damages. Knowledge of consequential
losses normally is available only to the customer because only he
knows the product's intended use and the probable results of its
inoperability." This knowledge puts the customer in a better posi-
tion to gauge the loss caused by a qualitative or functional defect.
Depending on the magnitude of the probable loss, he can either
bargain for a warranty"8 or protect himself through backup sys-
tems. A customer of light bulbs, for example, may be very certain
to obtain a powerful warranty and may invest a great deal of time
in the purchase decision where the light bulb will be used in, say, a
hospital operating room.
Sudden and dangerous defects are quite different. For exam-
ple, suppose that a light bulb explodes and sets the buyer's house
on fire. In such an unpredictable accident, the buyer faces consid-
erable uncertainty in estimating both the probability and the ex-
tent of the ultimate loss; indeed, he probably has no more informa-
tion about the possible extent of the loss than the merchant. In
fact, at the time of purchase, the consumer probably does not even
know the right questions to ask regarding such accidents. Buyers
do consider risks of function and quality; questions such as "Will
this product do my job?," "How long will this product work?" and
77 But while the consumer knows most about his own needs, the manufacturer knows
most about the product itself. Therefore, in some cases, the simplest way to match the cor-
rect product to a task may be for the manufacturer to make available information about the
characteristics of his product and let the purchaser decide which is best for his needs. See
generally Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1971). This solution would be
unavailable if the manufacturer were forced by law to provide a warranty, because he could
not trust the buyer's judgment as to the extent of loss exposure but would have to study all
possible intended uses and evaluate such exposure himself. A legal rule that has the effect of
always requiring the seller to become expert in all possible intended uses of the product has
obvious potential for significant waste.
78 East River Steamship, 106 S. Ct. at 2303 (recognizing the importance of the buyer's
knowledge of the size of potential losses). Even if the seller bears the risk of an economic
loss, his liability in contract is. limited by the principle of foreseeability. See UCC § 2-715;
Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng.Rep. 145 (1854).
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"How well?" are central to any purchase decision. But for most
products, it is not natural for a buyer to ask "Will this product
unexpectedly explode?" This dichotomy justifies voluntary alloca-
tion of risks concerning quality or function, and protection of the
buyer through products liability from defects resulting in sudden
and dangerous accidents.
b.) Large benefits of voluntary allocation of risks. Voluntary
allocation of product quality risks should be preserved where the
benefits of allowing such allocation outweigh the costs imposed by
market defects. Voluntary risk allocation can be an improvement
over fixing liability on the manufacturer by law only when buyers
and sellers agree that the buyer should bear the risk. In theory,
manufacturers should be indifferent to bearing risk since they can
simply adjust prices to pass along the costs.7 9 There are three im-
portant reasons, however, why the buyer might prefer and should
be permitted to bear product quality risks.
(1) Fixed risks and the inappropriateness of risk spreading.
When tort law fixes liability on manufacturers for qualitative and
functional defects, a manufacturer's inevitable response will be to
spread the cost of the risk among all purchasers of his product.
Such a rule forces buyers who have great knowledge about their
needs and the products that will meet them to insure against a risk
they do not face-the possibility that the product will not be fit for
their particular uses. Buyers thus have no incentive to acquire in-
formation; they are less likely to do preliminary tests with a prod-
uct, to consider backup systems, or to invest resources to learn
more about which products best meet their needs. As a result,
some economic losses that are worth preventing are not prevented
because the costs of prevention must be borne in full, while the
costs of the loss can be largely externalized to the other purchasers
of the product.
Similarly, the rule forces buyers who will suffer no conse-
quential losses from inoperability of a product to pay as much for
insurance as buyers for whom failure of the product would result
in catastrophic, though foreseeable, 'consequential losses. Some
buyers who have no need for insurance may be deterred from buy-
7' Manufacturers gain no competitive advantage from the lower pricing that results
from shifting risks to middlemen or final purchasers, because buyers' demand curves will
simply be depressed by an amount corresponding to their costs of bearing the risks. For
responsible buyers at least, tort remedies available to injured third parties serve to internal-
ize the costs of their injuries to the parties involved in the purchase transaction, and from
the third parties' standpoint it should not matter which party bears the risk, as long as they
do not seek to avoid it altogether through fraud.
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ing products because of the liability insurance component of the
price. On the other hand, buyers with inadequate information, or
those who are susceptible to huge losses, may be encouraged to buy
the product because part of their insurance cost would be subsi-
dized by low-risk buyers. This state of affairs is akin to the adverse
selection that would result if insurance companies charged low-risk
insureds and high-risk insureds the same premium.
Allowing a sale-by-sale allocation of qualitative and functional
risks will make it more likely that the socially optimal amount of
resources be invested in trial runs and research by the prospective
buyers. Buyer-specific risk allocations also eliminate the subsidiza-
tion of high-risk buyers. Therefore, risks of quality and function
are most appropriately allocated by agreement of the parties at the
time of sale-that is, through warranties.
The UCC permits the merchant and purchaser to negotiate
over the terms and extent of the manufacturer's liability for flaws
of quality and function. This freedom to bargain would be lost if
the manufacturer's liability was to be governed by tort law. The
UCC provisions relating to warranties, 0 limitations on remedies,8l
limitations on actions 8 2 and notice 3 would necessarily become ir-
relevant because a parallel action in strict liability would always be
available without these limitations.8 4 These provisions, adopted as
statutory law by nearly every state legislature, should not be ren-
dered meaningless by judicial fiat.8 5
In contrast to qualitative or functional defects, defects causing
UCC § 2-316(1).
81 Id. § 2-719.
8 Id. § 2-725.
83 Id. § 2-607(3)(a).
84 Even if one assumes that a tort action should not be allowed to the same purchaser
who explicitly agreed to accept the risk, there remains the problem of giving a tort action to
third parties. By filing a tort action, a party not in privity could enjoy the benefit of warran-
ties that may have been expressly disclaimed in the original sale or could maintain an action
even though the statute of limitations had run out on the original purchaser. We would have
the anomalous situation in which the party not in privity would be owed a greater obligation
by the merchant despite his less direct relationship with the merchant than the original
purchaser bound by the UCC limitations.
s' Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784, 793 (1978). See also
John W. Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the UCC
and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 Tenn. L. Rev. 123 (1974); John W. Wade, Tort Liabil-
ity for Products Causing Physical Injury and Article 2 of the UCC, 48 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 2
(1983).
Apparently, only one court has taken this point to its logical extreme. See Cline v.
Prowler Industries of Maryland, Inc., 418 A.2d 968 (Del. 1980) (refusing recovery in strict
products liability action for either personal injury or property damage caused by a defective
product, in deference to legislative preemption in adopting the UCC).
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sudden and dangerous accidents justify risk spreading, because as
to such accidents the buyer's special knowledge is significantly less
relevant. Repeat purchases, for example, are unlikely to inure a
buyer to a sudden and dangerous accident if he eventually
purchases a single unit that is dangerously defective. Predicting
the losses from a sudden and dangerous accident is also much
more difficult for buyers since, by hypothesis, customers cannot
predict when or how such accidents will occur. When customers
misapprehend or erroneously discount risk, there is no reason to
assume that a warranty negotiated in the market is a socially desir-
able allocation of risk.86 Because the known risks to buyers in such
situations are essentially undifferentiable, a common form of insur-
ance is much more attractive.
(2) Warranty overhead costs. Warranties involve significant
overhead costs in addition to the actual repair or replacement costs
of the products.8 7 Self-warranting buyers can avoid many of these
overhead costs and therefore save more in the reduced price than
the value of the warranty.
Any system of insurance, including both warranty and prod-
ucts liability, must limit recovery to the actual value of the loss,88
at least in the absence of any egregious behavior that might justify
punitive damages. Otherwise, the insured has an incentive inten-
tionally to cause losses.80 To avoid this moral hazard, the value of a
warranty or tort right guaranteeing the quality or function of a
good must diminish as the value of the good itself diminishes over
time. Because many overhead costs associated with warranty ser-
vice-costs of transportation, communication, and spurious
claims-remain roughly constant, the proportion of the total cost
of the guarantee that corresponds to actual repair or replacement
costs diminishes. As the proportion of the warranty costs devoted
to overhead increases, at some point a reasonable buyer would pre-
fer to terminate the guarantee in order to save the overhead costs.
Thus the buyer has a strong interest in bargaining over the opti-
86 For a useful discussion of the importance of customer risk perception in justifying
product warranties, see Shavell, Accident Law at ch. 3, § B.11 (cited in note 69).
97 Warranty claims usually involve the costs of notifying the warrantor of the claim,
transporting the defective product to the warrantor for repair, transporting the repaired
product back to the purchaser, and lost use of the product during the repair. Additional
costs include processing of spurious claims, damage in transit, and if the repair is unsatisfac-
tory, the costs incurred in making a new claim or seeking legal vindication of warranty
rights.
8 This idea is embodied in the insurance law principle of "insurable interest." See gen-
erally Robert E. Keeton, Basic Text on Insurance Law § 3.3 (1971).
" Id. at § 3.1(b).
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mal duration of a warranty in those instances where he decides to
pay for one.
In practice, buyers generally do not demand warranties cover-
ing most or all of a product's useful life. Most warranties cover
only a brief period immediately following the sale, such as 90 days
to one year in the case of electronics and home appliances. The
warranty periods on more costly goods such as automobiles and
computers rarely approach the products' useful lives. One explana-
tion for many buyers' apparent preferences for short-term warran-
ties may be that functional and qualitative flaws in most products
appear immediately after use of the product begins, and under the
warranty, such products are repaired or replaced. With the lowered
odds that a defect will appear after the warranty period, and with
the product continuously depreciating in value, the buyer may pre-
fer to bear the risk himself and save the substantial overhead costs
of an extended warranty.
While overhead costs are also present when the manufacturer
bears the risk of sudden and dangerous accidents, such costs are
much more likely to be worth incurring than when the risk is only
of economic loss. Because sudden and dangerous accidents
threaten harm both to the product itself and to persons and collat-
eral property, the diminishing value of the product itself is less
relevant because items of value other than the product itself re-
main at risk and must be insured.
(3) The moral hazard problem. Unlike negotiated warran-
ties, products liability damage measures do not diminish in value
as the product itself ages.90 Where a products liability remedy per-
mits replacement of an old, worn product with a brand new one, or
where incidental services to honoring a warranty are for some rea-
son valued, there may be spurious claims of defect. For example, if
a purchaser could buy a light bulb with a one-year warranty cover-
ing repair and replacement, he might be tempted to use the bulb
for eleven months and then to break the filament so as to obtain a
new light bulb. Even if the warrantor can detect this fraudulent
behavior, he must expend resources to litigate or settle the spuri-
90 See Industrial Uniform Rental Company, 463 A.2d at 1091 ("The extension of strict
liability to cover economic losses in effect would make a manufacturer the guarantor that all
of its products would continue to perform satisfactorily thoughout their reasonably produc-
tive life."); Seely, 403 P.2d at 150-51 ("[T]his liability could not be disclaimed, for one pur-
pose of strict liability in tort is to prevent a manufacturer from defining the scope of his
responsibility for harm caused by his products.. . . The manufacturer would be liable for
damages of unknown and unlimited scope."), citing Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (1963).
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ous claim.
Other types of moral hazards are common to all warranties,
even where the warranty payback diminishes as the product ages.
For example, buyers under warranty may have incentives to use
products excessively, failing to take simple maintenance precau-
tions.91 Sellers can only roughly control for overuse and abuse 2 be-
cause of the high costs of drafting and monitoring user-specific
contract terms.93
In contrast to the moral hazards pertaining to functional and
qualitative risk allocations, moral hazards relating to liability for
sudden and dangerous accidents are less problematic. First, sudden
and dangerous accidents may be difficult or dangerous to fake. A
person who might overuse or abuse a light bulb would probably
balk at arson, for example. Perhaps more importantly, defects
causing sudden and dangerous accidents are easier to verify objec-
tively than alleged failures of expected quality or function.
C. In Defense of The Sudden and Dangerous Test: Delineating
the Border Between Product Quality Risks and Physical Harm
The inappropriateness of risk spreading, the significance of
overhead costs, and the moral hazard problem, as well as improved
consumer deliberation, underscore the need for distinctive treat-
ment of risks of economic loss as opposed to risks of physical
harm. Voluntary allocation of the risks of qualitative and func-
tional defects produces benefits in the market, while placing the
risk of catastrophic accidents on the manufacturer serves other im-
portant policy considerations. Predictable rules to discriminate be-
tween quality and function risks (economic loss) and other types of
risk (physical harm) are necessary to preserve the benefits of both.
While these risks could be classified on a case-by-case weigh-
ing of these policy considerations, such a process would be compli-
cated, time-consuming, and costly. Because of this complexity, it
would be difficult for market participants to estimate ex ante how
the risks would be classified by courts and to adjust their conduct
to the legal risk classification. As a result, manufacturers would in-
corporate an uncertainty premium into the price of products to en-
sure they were compensated for the risk that a court would hold
91 For a discussion of the moral hazard problem, see Shavell, Accident Law at ch. 8,
§ B.3 (cited in note 69).
"2 UCC § 2-315 embodies the presumption of an implied warranty, unless excluded or
waived under § 2-316, that goods are fit for the buyer's particular purposes.
93 See Shavell, Accident Law at ch. 8, § B.4 (cited in note 69).
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them liable despite the parties' contrary agreement.
To avoid this problem, courts should adopt a simple rule that
embodies the general policy concerns. The sudden and dangerous
test provides a workable and accurate distinction between acci-
dents that should be actionable in tort and losses that should re-
main in the domain of warranty law. It focuses on the nature of the
accident that caused the loss-or, more precisely, it requires an ac-
cident in the conventional sense of the word: something must hap-
pen that seriously endangers person or property. The suddenness
requirement excludes accidents that were predictable before they
began and controllable afterward. The dangerousness requirement
includes only those accidents that products liability was designed
to treat; that is, it excludes risks unrelated to safety. Consequently,
the sudden and dangerous test preserves nearly all the benefits re-
sulting from efficient, voluntary allocation of risk.
Courts applying the test have argued that neither suddenness
nor dangerousness alone is sufficient to justify treating the loss in
tort. For example, in Northern Power & Engineering Corp. v. Cat-
erpillar Tractor Co.94 an engine failed, resulting in severe damage
to the engine itself but no additional injury to persons or property.
The court held that claims arising from an accident that was sud-
den but not dangerous did not sound in tort.9 5 Moreover, the court
noted, "[t]he requirement that the loss occur under dangerous cir-
cumstances is necessary because . . . allowing recovery solely on
proof that a defect could endanger persons or property is too spec-
ulative."96 If any risks are to be subject to voluntary allocation, the
risk that a product will simply stop working without endangering
persons or other property, as in Northern Power, should qualify.
Likewise, courts have held that dangerousness alone is not suf-
ficient to bring a loss into tort. In Russell v. Ford Motor Co.,97 the
Oregon Supreme Court observed that physical harm "must be a
consequence of the kind of danger and occur under the kind of
circumstances . . . that made the condition of the product a basis
1, 623 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1981).
95 Id. at 329-30. The court observed:
There is no evidence in the record that such a defect presented a danger to persons or
other property and no evidence of violence, fire, collision with external objects, or other
calamity as a result of this failure. The engine apparently just stopped operating. [The]
loss is, therefore, entirely economic.
" Id. at 329 n.11 (emphasis in original). See also Comment, Oregon Adopts the Degree
of Danger Test for Strict Liability-The Implied Warranty Alternative, 58 Or. L. Rev. 545,
552 (1980).
9 281 Or. 587, 575 P.2d 1383 (1978).
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for strict liability. This distinguishes such a loss from economic
loss due only to the poor performance or the reduced resale value
of a defective, even a dangerously defective, product."9 8 Risks of
defects that merely threaten to become dangerous through contin-
ued use are precisely the risks that parties should be free to allo-
cate because they amount only to the risk that the product will
have to be repaired or replaced due to inadequate quality or func-
tion. In fact, the category of "dangerous but not sudden accidents"
may be quite small. The idea of "danger" and, indeed, the very
idea of an "accident" naturally imply suddenness, 99 because if a
situation is not sudden, it may be avoidable. For example, recall
the person who purchased a light bulb. Suppose that after six
months of service, the bulb begins to burn so dimly in the operat-
ing room that the owner can no longer safely perform surgery. The
danger posed to his patients does not justify treating removal and
replacement costs in tort because the danger, being expected, is
avoidable.
III. ABATEMENT IN SCHOOLS-TORT OR CONTRACT LiABmIITy?
Most courts that have been faced with school boards' claims
against asbestos manufacturers for the recovery of abatement costs
have allowed recovery in tort for damage to the defective product
itself-that is, for the cost of replacing the asbestos. 100 Using the
framework developed in part II, this section first criticizes the rea-
soning of the majority of courts in these cases. Then, applying the
"sudden and dangerous" test to claims for recovery of costs of re-
moving asbestos from school buildings, it concludes that because
the presence of asbestos constitutes a dangerous but not sudden
accident, such claims should not be compensable in tort. Finally,
this part demonstrates that the result of applying the sudden and
dangerous test in this case is consistent with much of the underly-
ing policy for which the test serves as a proxy.
, 575 P.2d at 1387.
See Vulcan Materials, 306 S.E.2d at 257 ("An 'accident' should be defined as a sud-
den and calamitous event which, although it may only cause damage to the defective prod-
uct itself, poses an unreasonable risk of injury to other persons or property."); Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc.2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (re-
covery denied in tort for lack of an "accident" when defects in airplane engines were discov-
ered before any accident occurred).
100 See, e.g., City of Greenville, 640 F.Supp. at 564.
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A. Asbestos Abatement Case Law
Schools have successfully stated tort claims against manufac-
turers of hazardous building materials, even in jurisdictions that
limit recovery in tort to property damage, by characterizing the
cost of removing and replacing the materials as physical property
damage rather than as economic loss. 101 The reasoning in these
cases reflects misunderstanding of the underlying purposes of
products liability law, as well as a failure to appreciate the eco-
nomic consequences of these decisions. For example, several of the
commonly cited opinions are from jurisdictions that explicitly al-
low recovery in tort for all economic losses. 10 2 Such decisions are
not relevant to the meaning of economic loss in the jurisdictions
that do not allow tort recovery of such losses.
Most courts do not view replacement and removal costs relat-
ing to asbestos as economic loss because "asbestos-containing
materials have contaminated the building, damaging property and
posing a continual hazard to building occupants.' 0 3 This idea em-
bodies two arguments. The first pertains to collateral property
damage, and the second pertains to the creation of a continuing
hazard. As discussed below, collateral property that was contami-
nated before the danger could have been discovered might be re-
coverable in tort by means of the legal fiction of "sudden realiza-
tion."'' 04 But the latter point that the asbestos itself poses a
continuing danger to users of the building does not implicate tort
concerns because this danger of physical harm is speculative and
avoidable. 0 5 It is not relevant that the building materials became
101 See City of Manchester, 637 F.Supp. at 649; Hooksett School District, 617 F.Supp.
at 130-31. See generally Terry Morehead Dworkin and Jane P. Mallor, Liability for Formal-
dehyde-Contaminated Housing Materials: Toxic Torts in the Home, 21 Amer. Bus. L. J.
307, 319-20 (1983).
102 See Cinnaminson Township, 552 F.Supp. at 857 (expressly decided on the basis of
New Jersey's rejection of the doctrine of economic loss in Santor); City of Greenville, 640
F.Supp. at 564, citing the South Carolina case of Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d
768 (1980), as allowing recovery where economic loss alone was suffered.
103 City of Greenville, 640 F.Supp. at 564. See also City of Manchester, 637 F.Supp. at
649-53; Hooksett School District, 617 F.Supp. at 130-31.
104 See notes 115-17 and accompanying text below.
105 In Hooksett School District, 617 F.Supp. 126, the court advanced an argument
which might be used to evade disparate treatment of the elements of damage. The court
suggested that the asbestos component of the insulation and fireproofing was a defective
product that contaminated the insulation and fireproofing in which it was embedded. But
this attempt to characterize the asbestos-containing materials as themselves collateral prop-
erty and only the asbestos component as the defective product simply characterizes the de-
fect as the product. If this approach were to be the general rule, every product failure would
be a tort, since one could always characterize whatever part or component failed as a sepa-
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unusable because of a threat of danger rather than through struc-
tural deterioration or aesthetic deficiency. Continued use of a
product known to be defective will often be dangerous. Merely be-
cause it would be unreasonably dangerous for the owner of an au-
tomobile to drive his car knowing the brakes have become defec-
tive, he has no tort action against his auto dealer for removal and
replacement of his brakes.
Courts adopting the contamination theory, and a few that fail
even to discuss it, appear to have considered all the elements of
damages as if they fell into a single category.10 6 Such courts may
have thoughtlessly extended their conclusion regarding collateral
property damages to removal and replacement costs of the materi-
als themselves.
The more thoughtful opinion in City of Manchester v. Na-
tional Gypsum Co.' 07 explicitly rejected this comment's proposed
distinction between elements of damage, arguing that classification
as physical harm depends not on "the measure of plaintiff's dam-
ages [but on] the nature of the defect and the manner in which the
damages occurred." 08 While this court was correct in attempting
to look to the nature of the defect and the manner in which the
damage occurred, it failed to recognize that the defect was not of
the kind which causes sudden harm. The next section demon-
strates that such potential future hazardousness is insufficient to
allow recovery in tort.
B. Application of the Sudden and Dangerous Test
The now-familiar risks posed by asbestos are no doubt danger-
ous; but they are not sudden. They can be avoided either by abate-
ment or by closing down the school entirely.
Asbestos building materials may cause harm by shedding par-
ticles into the air that will be inhaled by human beings. 09 The per-
rate defective product and the remainder of the product as collateral property rendered
useless or inoperable by the failure of the component.
106 See also City of Greenville, 640 F.Supp. at 564; Adams-Araphoe, 637 F.Supp. at
1209; Hooksett School District, 617 F.Supp. at 130-31.
107 637 F.Supp. 646 (D. R.I. 1986).
10 Id. at 651. The court allowed recovery of removal and replacement costs because it
found that the hazardous asbestos products contaminated collateral property and that this
physical damage "may be measured by the cost of repairing and replacing the asbestos
products." Id. The court did note that a legal basis existed to distinguish repair and replace-
ment elements of damage from contamination damage, id. at 652 n.6, although it rejected
the distinction.
109 The process by which asbestos separates from material and is inhaled is slow and
exposure must occur over a fairly lengthy period of time at the low concentrations generally
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sonal injury that results from this inhalation is undoubtedly a ba-
sis for a products liability claim.11 Yet where this harm is mere
expectancy due to the presence of materials containing asbestos,
the harm may be avoided.
The possibility that asbestos materials will have to be removed
or encapsulated to prevent future damage is not the sort of danger
that should provide a basis for a products liability claim. It is anal-
ogous to a case in which acoustical tiles fail by discoloring or emit-
ting a terrible (but harmless) smell."" The need to remove these
tiles clearly represents economic loss rather than physical harm.
Although the school boards may, however, elect to continue
using their buildings with knowledge of the defect,11 2 they can do
so only at their own risk.l1 3 They would be consciously breaching
their duty of care to the students and teachers by exposing them to
asbestos.114 Because the products liability type risk they face-that
of future personal injury to building users-is avoidable, their
claims do not satisfy the sudden and dangerous test and therefore
should not sound in tort.
School boards may have valid products liability claims for
damage to collateral property that was contaminated by asbestos
prior to discovery of its dangerousness. The school boards could
argue that, while the process by which asbestos degrades is slow
and continuous, their awareness of the problem was sudden. 115 As
associated with schools. See notes 118 and 121 below.
110 See, e.g., Borel, 493 F.2d at 1087-90.
111 See, e.g., 2000 Watermark Ass'n., Inc. v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d 1183 (4th Cir.
1986); 1981 Attorney General's Report at 110 (cited in note 6).
112 While the actual danger created by the relatively low levels of asbestos found in
schools-for which bulk sampling confirms the presence of friable asbestos-is unclear, see
notes 118 and 121 below, schools have been aware of the problem for some time. See text at
note 27 above. To avoid penalizing knowledge, the law applies a "reasonable man" knowl-
edge standard. Hence, a school oblivious to the risk would be in no better position vis-a-vis
the "dangerous but not sudden" test than a school which, through reasonable diligence,
became aware of the risk.
"' See Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 102 at 710-12 (cited in note 21). The product de-
fect must be a proximate cause of the injury under strict liability. Id. at 710 & n.2.
"[V]irtually all courts have seemingly agreed that the conduct or misconduct of another,
including. . . the claimant. . . may be of such a nature or kind as to constitute a supersed-
ing cause." Id. at 710.
114 See Robert D. Lang, The Problem of Asbestos in the Public Schools, N.Y. St. B. J.
18, 20 (Nov. 1984); 1983 Oversight Hearings at 16 (cited in note 7) (statement of Neal Mc-
Bride, Director, Legal Services Program).
1'5 This argument has been successful in insurance cases where strong policy concerns
favored recovery for toxic contamination. See Jackson Township Mun. Utilities Auth. v.
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 451 A.2d 990, 994 (N.J. Super. 1982) ("[Tlhe act or acts [of
dumping the pollutants] are sudden and accidental regardless of how many deposits or dis-
persals may have occurred, and although the permeation of pollution into the ground water
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a result, damage caused by asbestos before its dangerous properties
were discovered could be characterized as sudden. Such damage
was unpredictable and uncontrollable once it was discovered.
Moreover, it was damage dangerous to property distinct from the
asbestos itself. Costs relating to replacement of contaminated cur-
tains and carpets, and perhaps a preliminary cleanup of any accu-
mulated loose asbestos fibers, would be recoverable under this in-
terpretation. 116 However, any costs associated with removal,
replacement, or encapsulation of the asbestos materials themselves
would not be recoverable in tort, because the future harm they
threaten is not sudden. 1 7
C. The Policies Underlying the Sudden and Dangerous Test: The
Asbestos Context
The purpose of the sudden and dangerous test is to classify
specific risks as physical harm or economic loss in such a way as to
preserve the advantages flowing from voluntary allocation of true
product quality risks, while encouraging manufacturers to internal-
ize costs of risks that consumers cannot or will not evaluate. The
sudden and dangerous test classifies the costs of asbestos abate-
ment as a form of economic loss. However, it is important to recall
that the sudden and dangerous test is justified by three different
policy considerations which attempt to account for the great diver-
may have been gradual rather than sudden, the behavior of the pollutants as they seeped
into the aquifer is irrelevant if the permeation was unexpected."); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock
Oil Co., 73 A.2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603, 605 (1980); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414
A.2d 220 (Me. 1980).
i"e See Walker v. Decora, 225 Tenn. 504, 471 S.W.2d 778 (1971) (cited with approval in
County of Johnson v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 580 F.Supp. 284, 292 (E.D. Tenn. 1984)); Hooksett
School District, 617 F.Supp. at 130-31.
The 1984 Act does not provide any federal assistance for removal or replacement of
contaminated property other than the asbestos itself. The Jackson Township court's inter-
pretation of "sudden," described in note 115 above, has the advantage of dovetailing with
the 1984 Act, resulting in liability for these elements of damage the 1984 Act may not cover
and only these elements. Liability complementary to the 1984 Act may be the optimal solu-
tion to balancing the burden of asbestos harms.
117 Recovery for collateral property through the "sudden awareness" theory of Jackson
Township does not provide a basis for characterizing the condition of the asbestos building
materials themselves as an accident causing physical harm. The "sudden awareness" theory
is, at best, a legal fiction that has never been used outside the insurance context.
Insurance agreements often transfer risk to heavily regulated, public-regarding entities
that specialize in bearing risk. In the case of asbestos purchased by school boards, the
purchase agreement was a sales contract that was actually intended to transfer risk to the
buyer. The purchase price did not include a risk premium to cover abatement costs many
years later, and the manufacturer was a purely commercial entity, subject to less regulation
in its sales terms, and not particularly expert in bearing risk.
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sity of products sold in the market. Depending on the product, cer-
tain factors will weigh more heavily than others. In the case of as-
bestos building materials, two of the three concerns identified
earlier are especially significant: 1) allowing the buyer to take ad-
vantage of his superior knowledge of his fixed needs, and 2) avoid-
ing moral hazards.
In the case of asbestos building materials, the first factor,
viewed at the time of purchase, tentatively supports voluntary allo-
cation of the risk of asbestos removal and replacement costs. Given
the continuing uncertainty about the level of exposure that consti-
tutes a health hazard, it is unclear whether asbestos manufacturers
were better able than buyers to evaluate low-level exposure
risks.118 Thus, the loss-spreading rationale for strict liability does
not seem to justify imposition of liability for such risks.'"9 Cer-
tainly the asbestos buyers (architects, who were agents of the
school boards) knew more than the asbestos manufacturers did
about the structures they had designed and the precise use to
which they would put the products. If manufacturers are now to be
liable in tort, they will, in the future, have to learn in fair detail
about the architects' planned use of their products to decide how
much to adjust their price to cover their liability. Not only will this
likely involve second-guessing the architect, but it will also intro-
duce substantial unnecessary cost to the sale.
The service of removal and reinstallation or of encapsulation
is the largest element of expense in abating asbestos building
materials. Unlike the value of the product itself, the value of ser-
vices does not diminish over time. Hence, the second factor, relat-
118 "[T]he exact nature of the dose-response relationships may be subject to considera-
ble debate. This is primarily because of the problems of exposure estimation." 1980 NIOSH
Study at 31 (cited in note 7). "In addition, no adequate epidemiolgical information is availa-
ble on the disease experience of workers exposed below the current standard and followed
for a sufficient period to identify long latency effects." Id. at 4. See also Oversight Hearings
on Asbestos Health Hazards to Schoolchildren, Hearings on H.R. 1435 and H.R. 1524,
before the Subcomm. on Elem., Secondary, and Vocational Educ. of the House Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1979) ("1979 Oversight Hearings"): "[H]ealth
effects cannot be unequivocally ascribed to asbestos air concentrations in the range . . .
found in the. . . schools sampled.. . . Furthermore, it is unlikely that a clear association of
such levels and the presence or absence of asbestos disease will be made in the foreseeable
future. This is the result of the lack of measurements of air concentrations in the past and
the need to follow very large populations exposed at lower levels for appropriately long peri-
ods of time."
" Consider also Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bank-
ruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. Legal Stud. 689, 729-30
(1985) (rejecting the suggestion that manufacturers can recover the costs of such liability
imposition by raising future prices).
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ing to high proportionate overhead costs does not apply in the case
of asbestos materials. But, because the service component main-
tains the value of the warranty over a long period of time, the
moral hazard is exacerbated.
As previously discussed, moral hazard, the third factor, is al-
ways a problem where insurance is involved. But moral hazards in
the asbestos abatement context are especially worrisome. The ef-
fectiveness of the necessary diagnostic technology is in doubt.120
Since there is no consensus about the levels of asbestos that pose
risks worth abating, and because of the very low levels of exposure
typically occurring even when asbestos is detected,'12' the decision
as to when abatement should be undertaken and what approach to
use when it is undertaken still entails a great deal of subjective
judgment.122
School boards, however, are likely to play it safe-both to
keep the children safe and to protect themselves from potential
liability-by undertaking unnecessary abatement if it can be done
at someone else's expense. 123 Similarly, even when some form of
abatement is justified, they may elect a more drastic remedy than
is necessary: for example, removal and replacement when encapsu-
lation would be adequate or even preferable. 24 They may carry out
120 Congress has responded to the lack of diagnostic certainty by passing the Asbestos
Hazard Emergency Act of 1986. Among other things, the Act requires the EPA to specify
asbestos inspection standards and appropriate responses. See note 12 above. In the past, the
EPA has directed local educational agencies to identify friable asbestos by visual inspection,
sampling, and analysis of samples. See 40 C.F.R. § 763.100 (1984). The problem with this
procedure is that it reveals the presence of friable asbestos but not the existence of airborne
particles. The mere detection of friable asbestos in building materials does not indicate that
asbestos fibers are being released into the air or, if they are, that they are in sufficient
quantity to justify abatement. See Corn, 47 Amer. Indus. Hygiene Assoc. J. at 520 (cited in
note 11).
121 The case studies conducted by the Department of Justice concluded that ambient
air testing often shows very low exposure levels even in situations in which physical bulk
sampling confirms the presence of friable asbestos. 1981 Attorney General's Report at 85
(cited in note 6); 1979 Oversight Hearings at 49 (cited in note 118).
122 See note 11 above. See also 1983 Oversight Hearings at 42-43 (cited in note 7)
(statement of Edward A. Klein, Director, Chemical Control Division, Office of Toxic Sub-
stances, EPA); id. at 51 (remark of Rep. George Miller, citing letter from John A.
Todhunter, Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances).
"I See, e.g., 1983 Oversight Hearings at 87 (cited in note 7) (testimony of Council for
American Private Education) ("A school undertook an expense of $66,000 to replace a ceil-
ing even though it had been assured by a reputable laboratory that the ceiling contained
only nonfriable asbestos. Once the presence of "asbestos" became known, public opinion in
the school could not tolerate its continued existence."); id. at 2 (statement of Rep. George
Miller) (school in Newton, Mass., spent $1 million to remove materials that did not contain
asbestos).
12 See 1983 Oversight Hearings at 43 (cited in note 7) (statement of Edward A. Klein)
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the operation in a costly manner. 2 5 And with so much uncertainty
inherent in the schools' decision-making processes, any wasteful or
unnecessary actions will prove virtually unassailable by defendants
in court.
Significantly, "extra" abatement and removal efforts by
schools may not only result in unnecessary or superfluous protec-
tion. They may cause affirmative harm. The removal of asbestos
materials may fail to reduce levels of suspended dust, or it may
even aggravate the problem. Asbestos particles will unavoidably be
released into the air when the building materials containing asbes-
tos are damaged during removal or containment.126 Moreover,
"[t]hese fibers that pose the danger are microscopic in size and
very difficult to detect even with the most highly technical
equipment.' 127
D. Policy Considerations Peculiar to Asbestos
Other policy factors unique to asbestos also support classifica-
tion of abatement costs as economic losses. First, most school
boards have already completed abatement by the time they begin
to consider legal action against the manufacturer. 2 " Although com-
pletion of abatement should not be a factor in deciding individual
cases, it is important to note, from a broad public policy stand-
point, that in most cases the issue is not whether abatement will
occur but merely how the costs will be distributed.129
("In cases where the friable material is in poor condition or subject to disturbance, the most
appropriate action may be to either remove, enclose, or encapsulate the material."). But in
the case of a local Washington-area school, the cheap option of encapsulation was rejected
and "the school chose the most expensive solution: removal and replacement." Id. at 88
(statement of Council for American Private Education).
125 The costs of similar abatement efforts have varied tremendously. See, e.g., id. at 46
(statement of Edward A. Klein), 87 (testimony of Council for American Private Education).
126 Id. at 34 (statement of Edward A. Klein).
121 Ambach, 474 N.Y.S.2d 244 (finding that plaintiff's asbestos management system en-
tailing use of high efficiency vacuums would not remove these particles from the air).
128 See notes 13 and 20 and accompanying text above. Of the claims that have been
adjudicated to date, nearly all have been claims for costs of abatement already complete.
See, e.g., City of Greenville, 640 F.Supp. 559; City of Manchester, 637 F.Supp. 646; Hooksett
School District, 617 F.Supp. 126.
"0 Two sections of the 1984 Act essentially adopt a policy of not permitting reimburse-
ment of abatement costs if the abatement has been completed prior to the adoption of the
statute. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4012(g)(3), 3605(c)(3). In recognition of the limited resources available
to meet the problem, Congress apparently intended the law to treat projects that had al-
ready been completed differently from those that had not.
Schools may, if they are wealthy, fund abatement from capital funds. For church-re-
lated schools, the money can be found within their religious sponsoring organizations. Public
school districts may also have the options of fund raising, tax increases, diversion of funding
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Second, to the extent that the need to remove and replace as-
bestos in the schools ex ante was a "remote risk,"'130 it may be in-
appropriate to hold manufacturers liable, because firms will not in-
sure fully against remote risks. Firms insure against products
liability only to the extent that they can anticipate the largest ex-
pected liability. Thus, firms are bound to be underinsured against
liability for remote risks.131 When these remote risks materialize
and the uninsured products liability costs exceed the firm's wealth,
the firm will have strong incentives to avoid paying future claim-
ants by inefficiently spending or liquidating assets.1 32 Bankruptcy
law cannot prevent firms from liquidating inefficiently unless the
firm is unable to pay off existing claimants, 33 and managers may
believe that it is in the shareholders' best interests to pursue strat-
egies with high current payout.1 34 As a result, imposing liability on
manufacturers for remote asbestos risks may not only fail to com-
pensate schools, but it may also generate inefficiencies for future
manufacturers who face similar impositions of remote risk liability.
A third benefit of requiring school boards to pay for asbestos
abatement is that this approach does not drain the limited funds
of the asbestos manufacturers. Several large asbestos manufactur-
ers have gone bankrupt satisfying the claims of victims who have
already suffered personal injury from exposure to asbestos and who
have no other hope of recovery,135 even though most suits are yet
from other public expenditures, or issuance of municipal debt. See 1984 Asbestos Hearings
at 8 (cited in note 16) (many school districts can afford to pay 50 percent of abatement
costs).
"3 Remote risks may be defined as those risks of great harm of which the manufac-
turer was ignorant or believed to be unlikely, and for which "research to correct either im-
pression was not cost justified." Schwartz, 14 J. Legal Stud. at 718 (cited in note 119). Cer-
tainly, given the uncertainty surrounding the magnitude of risks from exposure to asbestos,
at least some of the risks from asbestos are "remote" because they are "more dangerous
than a firm would predict if it had done the cost-effective amount of research into safety."
Id. at 691.
131 Id. at 718-20. Schwartz also notes that even the abolition of limited liability and the
extension of successor liability would not create proper incentives to insure. In fact, such
departures from corporate law would entail additional shareholder monitoring costs, disin-
centives to investment, and illiquidity of used corporate assets. Id.
132 Id. at 720-24. Schwartz describes two resource-wasting strategies: 1) liquidating de-
spite the fact that the firm's value as a going concern exceeds liquidation value and 2) un-
dertaking negative net present value projects with large early payouts. Both are consistent
with current shareholders' interests and certain aspects of the Johns-Manville bankruptcy.
Id. at 724.
133 Id. at 725-26.
134 For a discussion of this and related issues, see Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H.
Jackson, Cases, Problems, and Materials on Bankruptcy 121-22 (1985).
135 See The Effect of Bankruptcy Cases of Several Asbestos Companies on the Com-
pensation of Asbestos Victims, House Hearings, Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the
The University of Chicago Law Review
to be filed.' 3 6 By most estimations, there will not be enough money
to pay all the legitimate claims of people who have already suffered
indisputable physical injuries. 3 7 By allowing school districts to
bring a new and questionable class of asbestos tort claims, a class
that may dwarf present asbestos claims, 138 the courts are introduc-
ing a new competitor for the already inadequate pool of resources
available to compensate asbestos victims.
Finally, in the absence of strong reasons to shift risks, the case
for judicial imposition of remote asbestos risks appears to be par-
ticularly weak. Obviously, shifting losses creates transaction and
litigation costs. These costs should be avoided unless allowing a
tort claim advances fundamental goals of tort law." 9 If asbestos
removal and replacement were remote risks at the time of sale, im-
posing liability on manufacturers does not serve the condemnatory
function of tort law, because firms were not aware of the risk and
are therefore not morally responsible for failing to eliminate it. 140
Nor does imposition of liability for these risks effectively spread
the losses or serve goals of distributive justice.141
Even if these risks were not remote, judicial reallocation of
risks seems inappropriate in areas where Congress has acted. Pass-
ing three significant statutes in six years, the political branches
have demonstrated their recognition of, and desire to solve, the
school asbestos problem. These statutes and similar state laws
show particular concern for distributive justice.
For those school districts that have insufficient resources to
commence abatement without advance financial aid, government
help is available on both the state and federal levels. 42 Because
House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 10, 1983); Neil Maxwell, G.
Christian Hill, and Raymond A. Joseph, Manville's Big Concern As It Files In Chapter 11 Is
Litigation Not Dead, Wall St. J. 1, col. 6, 8, col. 1 (Aug. 27, 1982). A major concern in the
bankruptcy reorganizations is providing for future claims. See James S. Kakalik, Patricia A.
Ebener, William L. F. Felstiner, and Michael G. Shanley, Costs of Asbestos Litigation
(1983); Lewin, N.Y. Times D1, col. 3, D3, col. 1 (cited in note 1).
,"8 See, e.g., School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d at 1000 ("To date, more than 30,000
personal injury claims have been filed against asbestos manufacturers and producers. An
estimated 180,000 additional claims of this type will be on court dockets by the year 2010.").
,s7 See Lac D'Amiante du Quebec, 613 F.Supp. at 1550 ("Total [personal injury] liabil-
ity projections between the years 1980 and 2015 range from $7.6 billion to $87.1 billion.").
138 See Faye A. Silas, Asbestos-free, 71 A.B.A. J. 22 (April 1985); School Asbestos Liti-
gation, 789 F.2d at 1005.
139 See, e.g., Schwartz, 14 J. Legal Stud. at 728-29 (cited in note 119) (arguing that tort
relief rests on three types of justice: retributive, distributive, and compensatory).
10 Id. at 733-35.
1 Id. at 729-33.
142 See 20 U.S.C. § 4014(c)(2)(A) (making eligibility for, and the nature and amount of
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the 1984 Asbestos School Hazard Abatement Act considers the fi-
nancial need of the school district in deciding eligibility for aid,143
and the form and amount of financial assistance,14 4 the limited fed-
eral funds flow to those schools where abatement is contingent on
outside funding. Consequently, although the 1984 Act may be
grossly underfunded when compared to the total cost of abatement
for every school with an asbestos problem, it may work well as a
plan to aid the poorest school districts. But, as long as recovery in
tort is a possibility, the true effectiveness of this statutory response
will remain impossible to assess. Wealthy school boards, those
most likely to have completed abatement, have nothing to lose by
bringing their cases to court, and may indeed be able to pursue
litigation more aggressively. Even poorer school boards will prefer
a products liability judgment to some mix of loans and grants.
CONCLUSION
Denying recovery in tort for school boards' asbestos abatement
costs upholds the broad policy rationales underlying the distinc-
tion between economic loss and physical harm. This conclusion fol-
lows from necessary principles of bargaining in the market and re-
alistic methods of judicial determination. Denying recovery will
not mean that school boards will forego abatement; rather, they
will have the proper incentives to draw on all other available re-
sources and disburse the funds efficiently.
The indiscriminate use of asbestos and the harm it has caused
are surely one of the greatest tragedies this country has faced in
the past decades. But the objective now should be to enforce sound
legal doctrine and, in so doing, bring a wide variety of resources to
bear on the problem. This is the only way the problem can be
wisely managed.
Lindley J. Brenza
financial assistance dependant on financial need); 20 U.S.C. § 4014(e)(1) (authorizing a loan
of up to 100 percent or a mix of loans and grants if financial need warrants it). See also note
16 above.
143 20 U.S.C. § 4014(c)(3), (d).
14 20 U.S.C. § 4014(e), (d).
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